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I.   INTRODUCTION  
 Ignorance is not always bliss. Every day in the United States, 
there are over one hundred million debit card transactions complet-
ed to purchase goods or services;1 however, most consumers do not 
know or even care how they work–they just care that they work. 
This ignorance allows the card-issuing banks to charge “hidden” 
fees, known as interchange fees. Every time a debit card is swiped, 
                                                                                                                                 
 ? J.D. 2014, magna cum laude, Business Law Certificate with High Honors, Florida 
State University College of Law; B.A., Biology and minor in Business Administration, 
2011, cum laude, University of Florida. I would like to thank Professor Manual A. Utset, 
Jr. for his guidance and comments. I would also like to thank my family for their uncondi-
tional love and support.    
 1. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (pro-
posed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). There were 37.9 billion transac-
tions in 2009. Id.   
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fees are deducted from the amount taken out of the consumer’s bank 
account,2 and the remainder is deposited into the merchant’s bank 
account. Since, normally, neither merchants nor consumers are fully 
aware of the exact cost of the debit card interchange fees, the card-
issuing bank can abuse these fees.3 Even though merchants are 
aware of the fees, they likely will not stop accepting debit cards be-
cause they need to remain competitive in the market, and because 
consumers want and expect to be able to use them.  
 Before the Durbin Amendment, interchange fees were a percent-
age of the transaction cost and could be negotiated between the mer-
chants and the networks, such as Visa and MasterCard.4 Obviously, 
larger merchants with a greater number of transactions were able to 
negotiate lower percentage fees than smaller merchants.5 Senator 
Richard Durbin and other members of Congress saw a problem with 
this, so they proposed an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), seeking to 
“help small businesses, merchants, and consumers by providing relief 
from high interchange fees for debit card transactions.”6 The Durbin 
Amendment gave the Federal Reserve Board (Board) the rulemaking 
power to create regulations for debit card interchange fees so that 
they “shall be reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the 
issuer with respect to the transaction.”7 The Board was tasked to 
take into consideration the cost per transaction for the card issuer.8 
The final rule adopted by the Board provides that the interchange 
                                                                                                                                 
 2. Fees are not added to the purchase price stated when the consumer swipes his or 
her card, but instead are deducted from the price stated, so the merchant does not get the 
full transaction price. See Patrick C. McGinnis, Misguided Regulation of Interchange Fees: 
The Consumer Impact of the Durbin Amendment, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 285, 286 (2013).  
 3. This was true before and after the Durbin Amendment. See infra Part III.C.  
 4. See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Paradox of the Durbin Amendment: 
How Monopolies are Offered Constitutional Protections Denied to Competitive Firms, 63 
FLA. L. REV. 1307, 1315 (2011). The interchange fees were not negotiated between mer-
chants and the card-issuing bank. Id. Networks also had the ability to create categories 
based on the type of merchant or the transaction volume. See Debit Card Interchange Fees 
and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,723.  
 5. A merchant is able to negotiate the fees with its bank, and the merchant’s bank 
and the card-issuing bank can negotiate their fees. Interchange Myths and Facts, 
MASTERCARD, www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/021208 MythsFacts.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2014). To avoid thousands of separate negotiations, MasterCard sets “default”  
interchange rates. Id.  
 6. 156 CONG. REC. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Dur-
bin) (“My amendment sought to give small businesses and merchants and their customers 
across America a real chance in the fight against the outrageously high swipe fees charged 
by Visa and MasterCard credit card companies.”); see also 156 CONG. REC. S3695 (daily ed. 
May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). 
 7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010) (emphasis added).  
 8. See id.; Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,733.  
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fees charged cannot exceed the sum of $0.21, plus five basis points of 
the value of the transaction, as a fraud-prevention adjustment.9   
 This Note does not suggest changing the goals of the Durbin 
Amendment, but instead suggests an alteration to the regulations 
created by the Board. The regulations suggested in this Note aim to 
better match the Amendment’s goals of being “reasonable and pro-
portional” while taking into consideration the card issuer’s cost per 
transaction. This Note suggests placing a double cap on interchange 
fees.10 The suggested fees would be reasonable because they would 
cap the total amount that can be charged based on the cost per 
transaction, and would be proportional because they would base the 
fees on a capped percentage of the purchase price. This Note does not 
suggest an exact value of either cap, because it would require more 
information to ensure that the caps capture the actual cost per 
transaction while taking into account the number of transactions 
with percentages that are potentially below the actual cost per trans-
action. This Note focuses primarily on the three parties participating 
in the two-sided market: (1) the merchant, (2) the consumer, and (3) 
the card-issuing bank. There are other parties involved in the debit 
card transfer, but their role in the realm of interchange fees is mini-
mal.11 These three parties are in a two-sided market because the 
card-issuing bank’s goal is to make sure that both merchants and 
consumers want to use its card. This is a careful balancing act because 
both merchants’ and consumers’ decisions are affected by fees. If the 
fees are too high then merchants will not accept the card, and if mer-
chants do not accept the card, then consumers will not want the card.  
 Part II examines the economic background and implementation of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and then explains the Durbin Amendment’s key 
parts. Part III explains how a debit card transaction takes place and 
the two-sided nature of these transactions. It also discusses the hid-
den nature of the debit card interchange fees. Part IV discusses the 
effects that the Durbin Amendment has on each of the parties, in-
cluding: merchants’ cost savings or lost profits on low-priced items, 
banks’ loss of revenue generation, the effect on exempted banks, and 
the possibility of switching to other methods of payment.  
 Part V discusses the advantages and disadvantages of some po-
tential alternatives. This Note discusses five possible alternatives to 
this problem: (1) leave the Durbin Amendment “as is;” (2) repeal the 
Durbin Amendment and return to a pre-amendment status with no 
regulation; (3) have no interchange fees; (4) change the Amendment 
                                                                                                                                 
 9. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,404 (July 20, 
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).  
 10. See infra Part V.E.  
 11. See infra Part III.A.  
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to cap the fees on the percentage of the sale; or (5) change the 
Amendment to cap fees on the percentage of the sale price while cap-
ping the total interchange fees. Ultimately this Note will suggest an 
alteration to the Durbin Amendment that caps both the fees based on 
a percentage of the sale price and the total amount allowed in inter-
change fees, so that the regulation more closely tracks the Amend-
ment’s goal of being “reasonable and proportional.”  
II.   DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT  
A.   History of the Financial Crisis and Implementation of the Dodd-
Frank Act  
 The U.S. Government passed the Glass-Steagall Act after the 
Great Depression, which created banking regulations.12 However, in 
1999, President Clinton repealed many of the banking regulations 
that were established under the Glass-Steagall Act.13 Many people 
believe that one cause of the 2008 financial crisis was the deregula-
tion of the banking industry and the fact that new regulations were 
needed to rehabilitate the economy.14  
 On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act became law.15 The Dodd-
Frank Act’s goal, as stated in its short title, is “[t]o promote the fi-
nancial stability of the United States by improving accountability 
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect the con-
sumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other pur-
poses.”16 Whether the Dodd-Frank Act is meeting this goal is a topic 
for many other articles.  
B.   Durbin Amendment  
 A few months after the Dodd-Frank Act was passed, Senator Dur-
bin recommended an addition, seeking to help small businesses.17 
This addition can be found in section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
entitled “Reasonable Fees and Rules for Payment Card Transac-
tions,” but is commonly referred to as the Durbin Amendment.18 The 
                                                                                                                                 
 12. See McGinnis, supra note 2, at 292. 
 13. Id.  
 14. See id. at 292-93. 
 15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),      
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010); McGinnis, supra note 2, at 293.  
 16. Dodd-Frank Act § 1.   
 17. See 156 CONG. REC. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). 
 18. Dodd-Frank Act § 1075. 
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Durbin Amendment, which took effect on October 1, 2011, adds sec-
tion 920 to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA).19  
 Before the Dodd-Frank Act, debit networks incorporated an ad 
valorem percentage to determine the interchange fees for each  
transaction.20 Networks also had the ability to create categories 
based on the type of merchant or the transaction volume.21 Before  
the Durbin Amendment, the average interchange fee was between 
1.15% and 1.35% of the transaction cost, and averaged approximately 
$0.47 per transaction.22   
1.   Reasonable and Proportional  
 The Durbin Amendment gave the Board the rulemaking power to 
create regulations “regarding any interchange transaction fee that  
an issuer may receive or charge with respect to an electronic  
debit transaction.”23 The principle provided as guidance to the Board  
was that the interchange transaction fees “shall be reasonable and  
proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to  
the transaction.”24  
2.   Considerations  
 The Board was directed to consider the “functional similarity” be-
tween debit transactions and checking transactions that clear at par, 
as well as “the incremental cost incurred by an issuer for the role of 
the issuer in the authorization, clearance, or settlement of a particu-
lar electronic debit transaction.”25 However, the Board was not to 
consider “other costs incurred by an issuer which are not specific to a 
particular electronic debit transaction.”26 
 The Board requested public comment, as is required in the rule-
making process, to determine an interchange fee for debit transaction 
that shall be “reasonable and proportional to the cost[s] incurred.”27 
                                                                                                                                 
 19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2012); Dodd-Frank Act § 1075. 
 20. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,724 (proposed 
Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). 
 21. See id. at 81,723. 
 22. Richard A. Epstein, The Dangerous Experiment of the Durbin Amendment: Con-
gress’ Interchange Fee Limit is a Reckless Exercise in Price Regulation, REG.: CATO REV. 
BUS. & GOV’T, Spring 2011, at 24, 25; CADY NORTH, BUSINESS IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK 
DEBIT FEE CAP, BLOOMBERG GOV’T STUD. 12 (Lisa Getter ed., 2011). 
 23. Dodd-Frank Act § 1075.  
 24. Id. (emphasis added).  
 25. Id. See infra Part III for an explanation of a check clearing at par.  
 26. Dodd-Frank Act § 1075. 
 27. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,722 (proposed 
Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). See infra Part II.B.1.  
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The Board originally proposed two alternatives.28 Alternative  
one combined a cap of $0.12 per transaction and a safe-harbor level  
of $0.07 per transaction.29 Alternative two was simply a cap of  
$0.12 per transaction.30  
 The Board received over 11,500 comments from “issuers, payment 
card networks, merchants, consumers, consumer advocates, trade 
associations, and members of Congress.”31 The merchants suggested 
lowering the cap so that the savings could be passed along to con-
sumers because the costs were significantly below the $0.12 cap.32 
Merchants also suggested prohibiting exclusivity arrangements to 
increase competition.33 On the other hand, payment card networks, 
such as Visa and MasterCard, were concerned that the cap would 
decrease revenue for card-issuing banks, which would increase card-
holder fees and decrease benefits for merchants and consumers.34 Af-
ter considering all the comments, the Board adopted a modified ver-
sion of alternative two.35  
3.   Fraud Prevention  
 In addition, the Durbin Amendment allows the Board to create an 
adjustment to the interchange fees if the “adjustment is reasonably 
necessary to make allowance for costs incurred by the issuer in pre-
venting fraud in relation to electronic debit transactions involving 
that issuer; and the issuer complies with the fraud-related standards 
established by the Board.”36 The goal of this addition is to encourage 
the card-issuing bank to take necessary actions to prevent fraud.37 
4.   Small Bank Exemption  
 The Durbin Amendment does not apply to any card issuer that 
has less than $10 billion in assets.38  These “small issuers” will not 
                                                                                                                                 
 28. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,736.  
 29. See id. at 81,736, 81,755. 
 30. Id. at 81,738, 81,756.  
 31. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,394 (July 20, 
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).   
 32. See id. at 43,402.  
 33. See id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 43,404.  
 36. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2069 (2010). 
 37. Id.; Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,404 (July 
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).  
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2 (2012). The value of the assets was raised from $1 billion to 
the $10 billion in order to get enough votes. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1326; see also, M. 
Pierce Sandwith, Note, Debit Card Interchange Fees and the Durbin Amendment’s Small 
Bank Exemption, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 223, 234-36 (2012).  
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have to prescribe to the Board’s regulations of debit card interchange 
transaction fees and can instead charge whatever fee they need to or 
can.39 Only three credit unions and approximately sixty banks have 
enough assets to be affected by the Durbin Amendment, while ap-
proximately 7500 credit unions and 7000 banks are exempt.40 One 
reason for this exemption to the cap on interchange fees is that 
smaller banks have fewer transactions, and thus, they have fewer 
transactions across which they can spread their fixed costs.41   
5.   Final Rule  
 The final rule adopted by the Board is an adaptation to alterna-
tive two and provides that the interchange fees charged cannot ex-
ceed the sum of $0.21, plus five basis points of the value of the trans-
action, as a fraud-prevention adjustment.42 
III.   DEBIT CARDS AND INTERCHANGE FEES  
 When consumers want to purchase goods or services, they have a 
variety of payment options, including but not limited to: cash,43 
check,44 debit card, or credit card. However, consumers are increas-
ingly shifting to electronic payment methods such as debit and credit 
cards.45 This is good news for merchants, because they have an in-
formational asymmetry problem when consumers pay with checks, 
                                                                                                                                 
 39. Sandwith, supra note 38, at 235-36. 
 40. Epstein, supra note 22, at 24.   
 41. See David C. John, The Durbin Debit Card Interchange Fee Cap Hurts Consumers, 
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 17, 2011), http://report.heritage.org/wm3194.   
 42. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,404 (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). See supra Part II.B for a more detailed explanation of the 
Durbin Amendment.  
 43. In cash payments the purchaser provides the merchant with cash equal to the 
amount of purchase price. The risk that the merchant will not get paid does not exist here 
because goods and services are not exchanged without the full value of the cash unless 
otherwise agreed upon (under certain circumstances such as contracts or the delivery of 
goods, payment might not be tendered until after the goods are received). The downside of 
cash payments for merchants is there is a risk of theft from employees or outsiders. Addi-
tionally, the payments are not automatically deposited, so the merchant or merchant’s 
employees have to manually transfer the cash to the merchant’s bank.  
 44. In a check payment, the purchaser provides a check for the amount of the pur-
chase price. After the merchant receives the check, the merchant has to manually transfer 
the checks to the merchant’s banks because the deposit is not automatic. In the past few 
years there have been improvements in check depositing, such as being able to deposit 
checks by using the camera on your mobile phone. See, e.g., Press Release, Sun National 
Bank, Sun National Bank Launches SunMobile Deposit (Oct. 8, 2013), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-CO- 20131008-906737.html. This only eliminates the de-
posit problem and not the risk of adequate funds. Furthermore, check writing is time-
consuming and will slow down the checkout process, which may lead to merchants needing 
to staff more employees. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 1317. 
 45. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (proposed 
Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). 
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since merchants have no information about the consumers’ financial 
positions.46 Additionally, consumers often make larger purchases 
with debit cards and credit cards than they would with cash.47  
 Checks normally clear “at par,” and therefore, the merchant re-
ceives the full value of the check without fees.48 On the other hand, 
credit and debit cards both have interchange fees, but these higher 
fees are paid in exchange for greater merchant and consumer bene-
fits, such as convenience and assuring the merchant that there are 
available funds.49 Merchants are essentially paying for the option to 
have more information about the consumers’ financial positions, and 
to avoid making irreversible decisions without having all of the in-
formation.50 Both debit cards and credit cards also eliminate the has-
sle and risk of having and processing cash or check payments.51  
A.   Debit Card Transactions  
 Debit card usage has rapidly increased since the mid-1990s and is 
the fastest-developing form of electronic payment.52 The Durbin 
Amendment defines a debit card as “any card, or other payment code 
or device, issued or approved for use through a payment card net-
work to debit an asset account (regardless of the purpose for which 
the account is established), whether authorization is based on signa-
ture, PIN, or other means.”53 
                                                                                                                                 
 46. In check transactions, the merchant assumes the risk that there might not be 
enough money in the checking account to cover the cost of the purchase. See Epstein, supra 
note 4, at 1317. The merchant also has no additional knowledge about the consumer’s fi-
nancial position; therefore, the merchant has less information in these transactions than it 
does in debit card transactions. Id. 
 47. John, supra note 41, at 1.  
 48. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1316. At first glance, it seems like merchants would pre-
fer paying zero fees. However, there are some added risks, one being that the merchant 
bears the risk that there might not be sufficient funds to cover the cost of the purchase, 
and another being that the merchant takes this risk without any knowledge of the consum-
ers’ financial status. Id. at 1316-17. 
 49. Epstein, supra note 22, at 29. Often the fees for credit cards are higher than the 
debit card fee because the benefits for credit card users are generally greater. Id. 
 50. This is very similar to other option agreements or contracts because merchants 
are purchasing the option to get more information before making a decision. See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 544 (4th pocket ed. 2011) (defining option agreement as “[a] share-transfer 
restriction that commits the shareholder to sell, but not the corporation or other shareholders 
to buy, the shareholder’s shares at a fixed price when a specified event occurs”).  
 51. See supra notes 43-44.  
 52. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (proposed 
Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). 
 53. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2073 (2010).   
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 Most debit card transactions are processed in the following man-
ner, commonly referred to as the “open-loop” or “four-party” system.54 
The parties in this system are: the consumer; the merchant; the mer-
chant’s bank; the debit card network (e.g., Visa or MasterCard); and 
the entity that issued the debit card to the consumer, that is, the 
card-issuing bank.55 When a debit card is swiped, the consumer’s 
identity and bank account information is made available; however, a 
signature or a personal identification number (PIN) is needed to ini-
tiate the transaction.56 The transaction information is then sent to 
the merchant’s bank.57 If the transaction is authorized, then the mer-
chant’s bank sends the transaction information to a debit-card net-
work.58 This debit-card network connects the merchant’s bank with 
the consumer’s bank.59 A network is used to relay information 
through the bank that issued the consumer’s debit card.60 The con-
sumer’s bank then verifies that there are sufficient funds and that 
the card has not been reported lost or stolen.61 If there is enough 
money in the consumer’s debit account, then notice of a complete 
transaction is sent to the merchant through the processors, and the 
purchase is finalized.62 The consumer’s bank then transfers the 
transaction amount from the consumer’s account to the merchant’s 
account; however, the card-issuing bank assesses interchange fees 
and other processing fees at this point.63 The bank that issued the 
consumer’s debit card will transfer the funds to the merchant’s ac-
count at the merchant’s bank.64 The merchant will pay their bank for 
interchange fees and other processing charges at a later time.65   
 Merchants pay three types of fees: (1) to their bank; (2) to card 
companies, e.g., Visa and MasterCard; and (3) to the card-issuing 
                                                                                                                                 
 54. This Note focuses on the four-party, or open-loop system; however, it is important 
to acknowledge that there is a less commonly used “three-party” or “closed-loop” system. 
See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,723, n.6. The three-party 
system is different because the merchant and consumers contract directly with the net-
work, instead of the network setting the fees. See Lisa Farrell, A Step in the Right Direc-
tion: Regulation of Debit Card Interchange Fees in the Durbin Amendment, 15 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2011).  
 55. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,723. 
 56. NORTH, supra note 22, at 8.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (proposed 
Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). 
 62. NORTH, supra note 22, at 8.   
 63. See id. The card-issuing bank takes the interchange fee before transmitting to the 
merchant’s bank, so the merchant does not receive the full value of the transaction. Id.  
 64. McGinnis, supra note 2, at 288.  
 65. NORTH, supra note 22, at 8.  
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bank, i.e., the consumer’s bank.66 These fees are often one of the larg-
est portions of merchants’ costs of doing business.67 The Durbin 
Amendment only regulates the interchange fees to the consumer’s 
card-issuing bank.68 In an open-loop system, the interchange fees are 
set by the debit card-issuing bank69 and are often the largest portion 
of the fees for each transaction.70 The debit card-issuing bank and the 
merchant’s bank both receive a portion of the fees.71  
 Under their contractual obligations to networks such as Visa and 
MasterCard, merchants are not allowed to assess a surcharge on con-
sumers who use debit cards or credit cards instead of other payment 
methods.72 The consumer does not directly see the effects of the inter-
change fees; instead, the fees are incorporated into the price of the 
goods or services as a cost to the merchant.73  
B.   Debit Card Market  
 Electronic payment tools such as debit cards and credit cards op-
erate in a two-sided market.74 A two-sided market occurs during a 
three-party transaction, when the middle party has an incentive to 
make sure that the other two sides want to do business together.75 
“[T]he ability to satisfy one side of the market depends on the contin-
ued participation of the other.”76 In debit card transactions, card-
issuing banks need both merchants to accept and consumers to use 
debit cards in order to stay in business. Merchants will not accept a 
company’s debit card if the fees are too high or if there are no con-
sumers using that company’s card. Conversely, consumers will not 
obtain or use a company’s card if few merchants accept it or if the 
                                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. 
 67. Gregory D. Wasson, the CEO of Walgreens, stated that interchange fees are his 
company’s fourth-largest cost after salaries, mortgages and rent, and healthcare. Epstein, 
supra note 22, at 24.  
 68. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010).  
 69. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (pro-
posed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235); John, supra note 41, at 1.   
 70. Farrell, supra note 54, at 1083. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. Merchants can increase the cost of their goods or services and therefore spread 
the cost of these fees among all payment methods.  
 73. See id.  
 74. See id. at 1087.  
 75. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1323. Examples of two-sided market scenarios include 
the following: (1) Newspapers put a greater-cost burden on advertisers because advertisers 
will only purchase ads if enough people read the newspaper, so the cost for readers has to 
be lowered to encourage more readers, Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 
23 J. ECON. PERSP. 125, 128 (2009); and (2) Groupon tries to match businesses with custom-
ers, and typically, the fees are borne by the businesses, Epstein, supra note 4, at 1324.  
 76. Epstein, supra note 22, at 26.   
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fees are too high.77 Therefore, card-issuing banks have to carefully 
balance the interests of both parties when setting the amount of fees 
and when determining who will bear the burden of those fees.78  
 In most two-sided markets, the fees are not shared equally.79 Typ-
ically, the party that is inelastic, i.e., less sensitive to changes in 
price, will pay a greater portion of the costs.80 A merchant’s demand 
for consumers is often less sensitive to changes in price than a con-
sumer’s demand for the goods and services provided by the mer-
chants.81 Therefore, merchants are more likely to bear a majority of 
the costs associated with interchange fees.  
C.   The Hidden Fee  
 The debit card interchange fee is similar to a “hidden tax.”82 The 
card-issuing banks are able to generate revenue with very little de-
tection, because normally, neither the merchant nor the consumer is 
fully aware of how much these fees cost since they are not billed sep-
arately to the merchant but instead are deducted from the amount 
deposited into the merchant’s account.83 Regulations such as the 
Durbin Amendment protect merchants from these hidden fees. 
 The consumer does not directly see the cost of the interchange 
fees; instead, it is incorporated into the price of the goods or services 
because it is a cost to the merchant.84 This is similar to a hidden tax 
for consumers, because if they are unaware of these fees, their spend-
ing and use of the card is not affected by the price of the interchange 
fee.85  However, if the listed prices are higher because of this addi-
tional merchant cost, then the consumer might be less likely to base 
a purchase on the sticker shock than if the fee was added on at the 
register.86 This is basic supply-and-demand economics: if the price is 
                                                                                                                                 
 77. See e.g., NORTH, supra note 22, at 15; McGinnis, supra note 2, at 301.  
 78. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 1323. For example, online dating services want to have 
an equal number of men and women, so they charge lower prices to women to attract more of 
them, because women are less likely to join an online dating service than men. Id. at 1324. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. The Ramsey pricing principle states that a price should be set so that the 
price-marginal cost margins are inversely related to the sensitivity of demand to the price; 
and thus, that more revenue will be recovered from the side with a more inelastic demand. 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], POLICY ROUNDTABLES: TWO-SIDED 
MARKETS 12-13, 25 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf.  
 81. Epstein, supra note 22, at 26.  
 82. See generally Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009) (explain-
ing that a hidden tax is a tax that goes unnoticed by those who pay them). 
 83. NORTH, supra note 22, at 8; McGinnis, supra note 2, at 288. 
 84. See Farrell, supra note 54, at 1083.  
 85. See Galle, supra note 82, at 75-77.  
 86. See Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1145, 1146 (2009). 
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higher, fewer consumers will demand the good or service; however, if 
the consumer is ignorant of the higher price—because it is hidden—
then it may not affect the demand.87  
 Since the interchange fees are taken out of the amount deposited 
into the merchant’s bank account, merchants may be unaware of the 
exact cost of these fees, unless they calculate the fees themselves. 
The merchants never see a bill with the total cost of the interchange 
fees.88 This might explain why the cost savings post-Durbin Amend-
ment may not have been passed along to the consumer.  
 The hidden nature of the interchange fees is beneficial for the 
card-issuing banks because they are able to generate revenue with-
out negative effects from either side of the two-sided market. When 
banks attempt to issue more obvious fees, they often lose consumers 
to other methods of payment.89  
IV.   EFFECTS ON THE PARTIES 
 Senator Durbin and other members of Congress saw a problem 
with the debit card interchange fee, so they enacted the Durbin 
Amendment to help small businesses.90 It remains unclear whether 
the Amendment actually helps small businesses;91 however, it does 
affect all three parties—the merchants, the consumers, and the card 
issuers—in a variety of ways. These effects are interesting because of 
the nature of the two-sided market; i.e., something that affects one 
party will also affect one of the other parties.92 Keeping merchants 
and consumers in the market, while simultaneously allowing the 
card issuer to make a profit, is a careful balancing act. This Note will 
discuss a few of the big issues and then explain the interwoven ef-
fects on the parties involved. 
A.   Cost Savings for Merchants  
 In an ideal world, merchants would pass their cost savings along 
to consumers; unfortunately, the real world is more complicated than 
that. Merchants save over $8 billion per year with the Durbin 
                                                                                                                                 
 87. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 82, at 75-77.  
 88. See supra Part III.A.  
 89. On September 29, 2011, Bank of America and other major banks announced a $5 
monthly fee for debit cards, but due to consumer outrage, the banks had to abandon the 
plan about a month later. NORTH, supra note 22, at 9.  
 90. 156 CONG. REC. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). 
 91. See e.g., McGinnis, supra note 2, at 285.   
 92. See supra Part III.B.  
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Amendment interchange fees.93 If merchants do not pass these sav-
ings along to consumers, then consumers lose on both ends because 
the banks have to make the lost revenue up by charging additional 
fees or by cutting services.94 A decrease in debit card interchange fees 
would be good for the economy if the savings were passed along to the 
consumers and if consumer spending increased.  
 Scholars and analysts disagree on whether the savings are being 
passed along to consumers. Some say that merchants are holding on 
to the $8 billion in savings they received from the Durbin Amend-
ment,95 while others argue that the savings are being passed along to 
consumers.96 It is possible that merchants are unaware of their cost 
savings, which would explain why they have not lowered their pric-
es.97 There is also a possibility that card issuers will raise the inter-
change fees on credit cards because they are currently unregulated 
by the Durbin Amendment.98 If these fees increase, there may not be 
any cost savings for merchants to pass along to consumers.99  
B.   Lost Profits on Low-Priced Items  
 While high-priced items will create cost savings for merchants 
with regard to the interchange fees, low-priced items will cost mer-
chants more in fees.100 Merchants that sell items worth less than $20 
will actually pay higher interchange fees than they were paying be-
                                                                                                                                 
 93. Vicki Needham, Report: Businesses Passing on Swipe Fee Savings to Consumers, 
THE HILL (Oct. 1, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-
institutions/325851-report-businesses-passing-on- swipe-fee-savings-to-consumers. This 
also means that banks are losing $8 billion in revenue. See infra Part IV.C.  
 94. See infra Part IV.C. 
 95. The Durbin Effect: Two Years Later, Consumers Still Not Benefitting from Durbin 
Amendment, ELEC. PAYMENTS COAL., http://wheresmydebitdiscount.com/the-durbin-effect/ 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014). This article, however, cites a survey that looks at low-cost items, 
such as milk, peanut butter, a hammer, and a Slurpee, to illustrate that the cost savings have 
not been passed along. This is flawed logic because low-priced items have a higher burden with 
the post-Durbin Amendment interchange fees than they did before the Durbin Amendment.  
 96. Vicki Needham, Retailers File Appeal Over Credit Card Swipe Fee Settlement, THE 
HILL (Jan. 2, 2014, 6:19PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/194318-retailers-file-appeal-
over-credit-card (quoting Mallory Duncan, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of 
the National Retail Federation).  
 97. See supra Part III.C. There are also a lot of other factors that could explain the 
increase in prices above inflation, such as an increase in other costs or an increase in de-
mand for a good or service.  
 98.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010). 
 99. This also suggests that if fees and costs can be shifted to credit card interchange 
fees, then the mere regulation of debit card interchange fees is a frivolous task; therefore, it 
would be beneficial to also regulate the credit card interchange fees, but this idea extends 
beyond this Note.  
 100. See infra Table 1.  
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fore the Durbin Amendment.101 Approximately 20% of all debit card 
purchases are for low-priced items.102 These small-ticket sales come 
from coffee shops, convenience stores, fast food restaurants, and oth-
er merchants that sell items or services worth less than $20.  
 Before the Durbin Amendment, there was special pricing for mer-
chants with low-cost items; however, after the Durbin Amendment, 
the networks set interchange fees at the maximum amount al-
lowed.103 Therefore, instead of using the ad valorem interchange fee, 
the maximum of $0.21, plus fraud prevention, is being charged.104 As 
illustrated in Table 1, when the transaction cost is below approxi-
mately $20, merchants are actually paying more in interchange fees 
than they were before the Durbin Amendment.  
 
Table 1: 
PRICE OF 
TRANSACTION 
 
BEFORE 
DURBIN 
AMENDMENT 
AFTER DURBIN 
AMENDMENT – 
FEE CAP 
AFTER DURBIN 
AMENDMENT – 
FEE CAP PLUS 
FRAUD 
PREVENTION 
MERCHANT 
SAVINGS OR 
(COSTS) 
 
Interchange fee 
of 1.15% per 
transaction 105 
Interchange fee 
of $0.21 per 
transaction 
Interchange fee of 
$0.21 per transac-
tion plus 0.05% 
Fee Before 
minus Fee 
After plus 
Fraud 
Prevention 
$1 $0.0115 $0.21 $0.2105 ($0.119) 
$5 $0.0575 $0.21 $0.2125 ($0.155) 
$10 $0.115 $0.21 $0.215 ($0.1) 
$20 $0.23 $0.21 $0.22 $0.01 
$25 $0.2875 $0.21 $0.2225 $0.065 
    $38106 $0.437 $0.21 $0.229 $0.208 
$50 $0.575 $0.21 $0.235 $0.34 
$100 $1.15 $0.21 $0.26 $0.89 
 
                                                                                                                                 
 101. See id.  
 102. Dakin Campbell & Donal Griffin, Visa, MasterCard Risk “Mom and Pop” Ire with 
Debit-Fee Increase, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-
23/visa-mastercard-risk-mom-and-pop-ire-with-debit-fee-increase.html.  
 103. Sandwith, supra note 38, at 241-42. 
 104. See e.g., Visa U.S.A. Interchange Reimbursement Fees, VISA 2-3, 7-8 (Apr. 20, 
2013), http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-usa-interchange-reimbursement-fees- 
april2013.pdf.  
 105. NORTH, supra note 22, at 6. This is just one example of the average interchange fee. 
Another source stated the average interchange fee was 1.35%. Epstein, supra note 22, at 25.  
 106. The average purchase price for all debit transactions is $38. NORTH, supra  
note 22, at 12. 
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PRICE OF 
TRANSACTION 
 
BEFORE 
DURBIN 
AMENDMENT 
AFTER DURBIN 
AMENDMENT – 
FEE CAP 
AFTER DURBIN 
AMENDMENT – FEE 
CAP PLUS FRAUD 
PREVENTION 
MERCHANT 
SAVINGS OR 
(COSTS) 
$250 $2.875 $0.21 $0.335 $2.54 
$500 $5.75 $0.21 $0.46 $5.29 
 
 Companies like Redbox and Starbucks that sell low-priced items 
have had to raise prices to cover the increase in debit interchange 
fees for their products and services.107 Redbox states the following on 
its website regarding its increase in prices: “The increase is a result 
of rising operational costs, including increased debit card fees.”108 
Redbox raised the daily rental price from $1 to $1.20 because of the 
increased fees. Redbox is also an interesting example because its busi-
ness plan requires the use of a debit or credit card for all purchases, so 
it cannot offset the increased costs by setting a minimum transaction 
price or by switching to other payment methods. Instead, Redbox has 
to pass the costs along to its consumers.109 Businesses such as coffee 
shops, dollar stores, and convenience stores could offset some of the 
higher fees by utilizing the minimum-purchase-price-per-transaction.  
 Merchants can now require a minimum purchase before allowing 
a consumer to use a credit card or debit card.110 Before the Dodd-
Frank Act, merchants would have been penalized for such require-
ments.111 Ideally, this would allow merchants to offset some of the 
added costs of accepting debit cards for low-cost purchases. However, 
merchants do not want to discourage consumers from making pur-
chases, so merchants have little choice but to accept debit cards in 
order to remain competitive.112 This forces merchants to pay the fees, 
especially with respect to companies with products and services worth 
less than $20.113 Companies, such as Redbox, with business models 
that require the use of a debit card or credit card, and without the abil-
ity to use a minimum purchase price to offset the higher interchange 
fees, cannot easily offset the added costs without raising prices.  
                                                                                                                                 
 107. General Questions: Price Change, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/pricechange 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014). There is speculation that Starbucks increased the price of some 
of its items due to the increased interchange fees. See Willy Staley, Starbucks Price Hike: 
Could Debit Interchange Be the Culprit?, MY BANK TRACKER (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.mybanktracker.com/news/2012/01/09/why-did-starbucks-raise-price/.  
 108. General Questions: Price Change, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/pricechange 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
 109. Id. 
 110. NORTH, supra note 22, at 12. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1319. 
 113. Id. 
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C.   Decrease Revenue Generation for the Banks  
 The Federal Reserve estimates that banks will lose around $8 bil-
lion annually due to the current interchange fees, assuming there is 
no change in debit card usage.114 This is approximately half of the 
roughly $16 billion that banks made in 2009.115 Card-issuing banks 
will want to make up for the lost revenue in other ways. Not only are 
the banks making less in interchange fees than they made in previ-
ous years, but these fees may not fully cover the cost per transaction, 
because the Federal Reserve used a narrow definition of which costs 
to consider when determining the cap.116  
 Card issuers can make up for their lost revenue by: (1) adding fees 
in other places, (2) cutting back on rewards programs, (3) imposing 
an annual fee, (4) raising other fees, or (5) lowering interest rates on 
deposits.117 However, the card issuers have to be careful with how 
they generate this revenue because they do not want to upset the 
careful balance of this two-sided market.118  
 Card issuers will have a more difficult time imposing other non-
hidden fees.119 For example, on September 29, 2011, Bank of America 
announced a $5 monthly fee for debit cards, but due to consumer out-
rage, it had to abandon the plan approximately one month later.120 
This more obvious fee was a problem for the card-issuing banks be-
cause consumers became aware of the fees. Assuming that cost sav-
ings after the final ruling on the Durbin Amendment are passed 
along to consumers, the overall cost to the consumer would probably 
be roughly equal to either: (1) obvious fees, i.e., monthly fees, or (2) 
the higher interchange fees. However, the effect on a consumer’s  
decisionmaking is greater when the fees are more obvious.121   
 Increased fees and decreased services make consumers worse off 
than they were before the Durbin Amendment; however, for the 
banks, this set-back only means that they will have to find a less ob-
vious and more straight-forward way to recoup their revenue.122  
                                                                                                                                 
 114. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,397 (July 
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235); Needham, supra note 93.  
 115. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,397. 
 116. See John, supra note 41, at 1.   
 117. Id. at 2.  
 118. See supra Part III.B. 
 119. See supra Part III.C.  
 120. NORTH, supra note 22, at 9. 
 121. See supra Part III.C. 
 122. See NORTH, supra note 22, at 10, for a chart of the mitigation strategies for the top 
ten bank-holding companies; also see id. app. at 17-18, for what these companies have told 
their investors.  
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D.   Effect on Exempted Banks  
 The Durbin Amendment does not apply to any issuer that has  
assets below $10 billion;123 meaning these small issuers will not have 
to subscribe to the Board’s regulations of debit card interchange  
transaction fees.  
 Small banks, though technically exempted from the Durbin 
Amendment, might also have a decrease in revenue generation due to 
the Durbin Amendment.124 Smaller banks have to spread their costs 
over fewer transactions, and therefore, they generally have to charge 
higher fees to recoup their costs.125 If the market—influenced by the 
Durbin Amendment—forces smaller, exempt banks to charge lower 
fees to remain competitive with the non-exempt banks, they might be 
forced out of the market.126  
 On the surface, the exemption appears to be good for smaller 
banks because they can charge higher fees.127 However, the real ques-
tion is whether these banks can afford to be exempt and charge above 
the cap. The cap on the Durbin Amendment interchange fees artifi-
cially lowers those fees below the competitive market-price. The 
smaller banks argue there is a risk that merchants will not accept 
their cards if the interchange fees are higher,128 and that the consum-
er would not want a card that was not accepted by merchants be-
cause it is a two-sided market.  
 The exempt banks have two choices: (1) lower their interchange 
fees and attempt to make the revenue up elsewhere; or (2) drop out  
of the market. With fewer players in the market, there is a greater  
monopoly-like effect.  
E.   Use of Other Methods of Payment  
 When banks are attempting to generate revenue in other  
manners, consumers might want to switch to other methods of pay-
ment, such as credit cards or cash.129 Banks will want to encourage 
and incentivize consumers to use services that generate the most 
revenue. Thus, if banks decide that the profit margin is not large 
enough for debit cards, they may encourage consumers to switch to 
other methods of payment.  
                                                                                                                                 
 123. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2070 (2010). 
 124. Sandwith, supra note 38, at 224 (arguing that the exemption might not be effec-
tive and instead suggesting a two-tiered system).  
 125. John, supra note 41, at 1. 
 126. Id. at 2. 
 127. Id. at 1.  
 128. Id. at 2.  
 129. Id.  
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 The interchange fees for credit cards are currently unregulated; 
therefore, banks can generate more revenue on swipe fees, as  
well as interest on late payments, without charging consumers for 
the use of a credit card.130 This might, however, create potential for 
abuse of the credit card swipe fees, which might eventually require 
congressional regulation.  
 It is beneficial to encourage people to only spend the money they 
have rather than borrowing from credit card companies, especially 
when the economy is rocky. These spending habits can help avoid the 
accrual of debt and subjection to high interest rates. A debit card is 
the ideal method of payment for consumers with self-control prob-
lems.131 Debit cards make it easier for consumers to manage their fi-
nances and avoid the dangerous possibility of over-spending that 
comes with credit card use.132 However, if the fees for debit cards are 
too high, consumers will use other methods of payment.133  
V.   SOLUTIONS 
 Senator Durbin and other members of Congress saw a problem 
with the debit card interchange fees.134 This Note considers whether 
the Durbin Amendment’s intended solution was optimal. To assess 
this, there are five alternative options to consider: (1) leave the Dur-
bin Amendment “as is;” (2) repeal the Durbin Amendment and return 
to a pre-amendment climate with no regulation; (3) have no inter-
change fee; (4) change the amendment to act as a cap on the percent-
age of the sale; and (5) change the amendment to cap the percentage 
of the sale price while capping the total interchange fee.  
                                                                                                                                 
 130. When the economy is bad, banks may prefer debit cards because the consumers 
cannot default on debit card payments. This brings up another informational asymmetry 
problem: banks want bad consumers, who may default on payments or spend more than 
they can afford, to use debit cards. However, banks want good consumers to use credit 
cards if banks can make more money from credit cards.  
 131. See Manuel A. Utset, The Temporally Extended Family & Self-Control: An Essay 
for Lee E. Teitelbaum, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 107, for a discussion on self-control as it relates 
to family law.  
 132. John, supra note 41, at 2.   
 133. See TOTAL SYS. SERVS., INC., 2011 CONSUMER DEBIT RESEARCH: FINAL REPORT OF 
SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP RESULTS (2011), available at http://www.tsys.com/ 
Downloads/upload/2011_TSYS_Mercator_DebitResearch _Final_2.pdf; Gail Cunningham, 
Overwhelming Majority of Consumers Would Change Financial Institutions to Avoid Pay-
ing Debit Card Fee, NAT’L FOUND. FOR CRED. COUNS. (Nov. 1, 2011), http://financial 
education.nfcc.org/2011/11/01/overwhelming-majority-of-consumers-would-change-financial 
-institutions-to-avoid-paying-debit-card-fee/.  
 134. See 156 CONG. REC. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).  
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A.   Leave the Durbin Amendment “As Is”—Cap on the Total Fee  
 The first option is simple: leave the Durbin Amendment as enact-
ed.135 The final adopted rule provides that the interchange fees 
charged cannot exceed the $0.21, plus five basis points of the transac-
tion’s value as a fraud prevention adjustment.136  
 The costs and benefits of the Durbin Amendment, as it currently 
reads, have been discussed throughout this Note.137 The Durbin 
Amendment creates overall cost savings for merchants that may  
or may not be passed along to the consumers.138 These savings are 
taken from the revenue of the card-issuing banks.139 The banks make 
up the lost revenue by reducing services or by charging other fees.140 
Additionally, merchants with low-priced items would have increased 
costs because the interchange fees would not be proportional to the 
transaction price.141 
 The expense of processing each transaction is the same, regardless 
of the monetary value. If the cap on interchange fees is set properly, 
then this method can accurately reflect the cost per transaction.142 
However, even assuming a cap on the interchange fees may accurate-
ly represent the actual cost per transaction, it does not meet the 
Durbin Amendment’s stated goal: to create a “reasonable and propor-
tional” interchange fee.143 Better interchange fees would spread these 
costs out more fairly based on the price of the transaction.144 
B.   Repeal the Durbin Amendment—No Caps 
 Under the next option, there would be no regulation of the  
debit card interchange fees, and the debit card interchange fees 
would return to pre-amendment status. This option ignores any  
problem that was present, or assumes there was none, before the 
Durbin Amendment.  
                                                                                                                                 
 135. See supra Part II.B for a more thorough explanation of the Durbin Amendment.  
 136. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,404 (July 20, 
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).  
 137. See supra Part IV.  
 138. See supra Part IV.A. 
 139. See supra Part IV.C. 
 140. See supra Part IV.C. 
 141. See supra Part IV.B. 
 142. See supra Part III.A (discussing how a debit card transaction works, which illus-
trates that the dollar value of the transaction is irrelevant to the cost to the parties).  
 143. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010). 
 144. See infra Part V.E for a discussion of a suggested interchange fee that is both 
reasonable and proportional.  
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 Without regulation, the market would set and determine the per-
centage of the fees, and larger corporations would get volume dis-
counts. One could definitely argue that this area does not need regu-
lation.145 Sometimes the best solution is no solution, because the 
powers of the market will come to the most equitable solution. How-
ever, due to the “big two” controlling the market—Visa and Master-
Card—the debit card market faces a potential problem for antitrust 
issues. The big two likely will not set the interchange fees at the most 
equitable point, because there is little, if any, competition in the 
market to balance their interests.  
 Another concern regarding a climate without regulation is that, 
due to this fee’s hidden nature, it has the potential for abuse by the 
card-issuing bank. Since merchants, and especially consumers, are 
not easily apprised of the exact amount of fees, they might be less 
sensitive to a change in the price of interchange fees, and the fees 
could rise in increments small enough to go unnoticed. Also, mer-
chants are relatively price inelastic because they want to accept debit 
cards for the ease and convenience provided to their customers.  
C.   No Interchange Fee 
 Another option would be to prohibit interchange fees. Under this 
option, debit cards would be similar to checks, which clear “at par.”146 
Some scholars suggest that all debit interchange fees should be abol-
ished.147 These transactions could instead clear at par, like checks;148 
however, debit cards provide multiple additional features that checks 
do not. First, with a check, a merchant has no added knowledge 
about a consumer’s financial position and bears the risk that there 
might not be enough money in the checking account to cover the cost 
of the purchase.149 Therefore, a merchant has less information in a 
check transaction than it does in a debit card transaction.150 Second, 
depositing a check is not automatic, and merchants have to manually 
                                                                                                                                 
 145. Scholars, such as Milton Friedman, might argue that a free market is the best 
solution to many economic problems, and that unregulated trade and business is far better 
than any artificial regulations the government can create. See e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM: FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY EDITION 182 (2002); MILTON FRIEDMAN 
& ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT (1990).  
 146. The merchant would receive the full value of the check without fees. Epstein, su-
pra note 4, at 1316. However, this ignores the fact that debit cards offer advantages of con-
venience, as well as assuring the merchant that there are available funds. Epstein, supra 
note 22, at 29.   
 147. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1322.  
 148. Id.; see also id. at 1322-24 (explaining why Georgetown University Law Center 
Professor, Steven Salop’s, argument to abolish all debit interchange fees so the transac-
tions clear at par is faulty).  
 149. Id. at 1317. Consumers will also pay an additional fee if their checks bounce.  
 150. Id.  
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transfer the checks to their own banks. Debit card transactions au-
tomatically place funds in a merchant’s bank. Third, check writing is 
time-consuming and slows down the checkout process, which might 
require merchants to staff more employees.151  
 A bigger problem with this option is that it only amplifies the rev-
enue problem for debit card-issuing banks. These banks would either 
move away from offering debit cards as a payment option, or they 
would make up the lost revenue in other ways. Although debit cards 
are similar to checks in some regards, they provide more benefits 
than checks, and these services need to be funded in some way.  
D.   Cap the Percentage of the Transaction152  
 Another alternative to the current Durbin Amendment is to place 
a cap on the percentage of the transaction price when calculating in-
terchange fees, instead of capping the total fees allowed. This cap 
could be used to artificially simulate a truly competitive market. Al-
so, this option would likely differ from the option to eliminate the 
Durbin Amendment only in the sense that the percentage of the 
transaction price would likely be lower, because the current market 
is not truly competitive.153 
 Using a percentage of the transaction’s interchange fees does 
achieve the Durbin Amendment’s goal of proportionality. However,  
as shown in Figure 1, calculating the interchange fee as a percentage 
of the transaction price154 grows without bounds. Therefore, it  
does not meet the Durbin Amendment’s stated goal of creating a rea-
sonable interchange fee.155 For higher-priced items, the interchange 
fees do not accurately represent the costs to the card-issuing bank for 
the transaction. 
E.   Double Cap: Cap Percentage of the Transaction Price and Total 
Interchange Fee  
 The final option—a double cap on interchange fees—is optimal. 
This option suggests adjusting the current Durbin Amendment  
to more closely match the goal of being “reasonable and proportion-
al.” The proposed adjustment would cap the ad valorem percent-
                                                                                                                                 
 151. Id. Not surprisingly, use of checks has decreased since the mid-1990s. Debit Card 
Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723 (proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). 
 152. This Note recommends this option as the second-best option.  
 153. See supra Part III.B. 
 154. The Before Amendment line is an interchange fee based on the percentage of the 
transaction price. 
 155. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010).  
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age,156 while capping the total value of the interchange fees.157 The 
total cap should be higher than the current $0.21, and the cap on the 
percentage should be slightly lower than the percentages set by the 
free market.158  
 For example, the regulation could state that there is a 1% inter-
change fee, with a cap of $0.50 per transaction.159 As shown in  
Table 2 and Figure 1 below, the interchange fee under the hypothet-
ical double-cap system is lower than the pre-Durbin Amendment fee, 
regardless of the transaction cost, because the percentage  
has been lowered. The hypothetical double-cap system has lower in-
terchange fees than the Durbin Amendment fees at both low and 
high transaction costs, using mid-range charges to compensate for 
the lost revenue.   
 
Table 2:  
PRICE OF 
TRANSACTION 
 
BEFORE DURBIN 
AMENDMENT 
AFTER DURBIN 
AMENDMENT – 
FEE CAP PLUS 
FRAUD 
PREVENTION 
HYPOTHETICAL FEE 
WITH TOTAL CAP AND 
PERCENTAGE CAP 
 
Interchange fee of 
1.15% per transac-
tion 160 
Interchange fee of 
$0.21 per transac-
tion plus 0.05% 
Hypothetical inter-
change fee of 1% with 
cap of $0.50  
$1 $0.0115 $0.2105 $0.01 
$5 $0.0575 $0.2125 $0.05 
$10 $0.115 $0.215 $0.10 
$15 $0.1725 $0.2175 $0.15 
$20 $0.23 $0.22 $0.20 
$25 $0.2875 $0.2225 $0.25 
    $38161 $0.437 $0.229 $0.38 
 
                                                                                                                                 
 156. This is to create a more proportional interchange fee.  
 157. This is to create a more reasonable interchange fee that reflects the true cost  
per transaction.  
 158. This can be seen infra Figure 1 by the less steep slope of the percentage. The 
graph also shows that the interchange fee will always be smaller than before the  
Durbin Amendment.  
 159. There is no specific math or empirical study to support these numbers. They were 
selected because the percentage of 1% is slightly below the 1.5% the free market set and 
the cap was higher than the $0.21 cap set by the current Durbin Amendment. It is likely 
that the true cost per transaction is lower than $0.50 but as explained infra Part V.E, the 
cap on the total should be set higher than the exact cost per transaction in order to offset 
the transactions where the interchange fee falls below the cost per transaction. 
 160. This is just one example of the average interchange fee. NORTH, supra note 22, at 
12. Another source stated that the average interchange fee was 1.35%. Epstein, supra note 
22, at 25. 
 161. The average purchase price for all debit transactions is $38. NORTH, supra note 
22, at 12.  
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PRICE OF 
TRANSACTION 
 
BEFORE DURBIN 
AMENDMENT 
AFTER DURBIN 
AMENDMENT – 
FEE CAP PLUS 
FRAUD 
PREVENTION 
HYPOTHETICAL FEE 
WITH TOTAL CAP AND 
PERCENTAGE CAP 
$50 $0.575 $0.235 $0.50 
$100 $1.15 $0.26 $0.50 
$250 $2.875 $0.335 $0.50 
$500 $5.75 $0.46 $0.50 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of Three Different Options for the Interchange 
Fee162  
 
 
 The cap on the total amount of interchange fees is designed to re-
flect the fact that the cost per transaction is the same, regardless of 
the transaction’s monetary value. The cap that can be charged should 
take into account more costs than the current cap does.163 The current 
formula does not include using fixed costs to implement and main-
tain the process for debit card transactions, and it also excludes 
large, non-electronic variable costs, such as customer service, billing, 
and advertising.164 The cap on the total amount of interchange fees 
should also be set higher than the exact cost per transaction, so as to 
offset those transactions with interchange fees below the cost per 
                                                                                                                                 
 162. This graph is a visual aid that demonstrates the differences between the inter-
change fees both before and after the Durbin Amendment, and one possible suggestion 
using the percentage-cap and total-cap option. As noted supra note 161, there is no specific 
math or empirical study used to support the suggested interchange fees. The graph is in-
cluded merely to illustrate the properties of the double-cap approach.   
 163. The cap should be higher than the $0.21 under the Durbin Amendment because it 
takes more costs into consideration.  
 164. Epstein, supra note 22, at 26.  
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transaction. In order to prevent the banks from withholding debit 
cards because they do not make any profit, the caps should be set 
slightly higher than the actual costs per transaction.165 
 The cap on the percentage will likely be slightly lower than the 
percentages set by the free market.166 This “free” market is not truly 
free, because of the few power players that control the market, such 
as MasterCard and Visa. The goal of a lower percentage is to more 
fairly represent what the percentage would be under a free market. 
However, it is possible that a regulation with the same, or slightly 
higher, percentage would accomplish the same double-cap goals as a 
proportional fee for lower-cost items, and a reasonable fee for higher-
priced items. This should be discussed in the rulemaking process.  
 A potential problem with this solution is that the debit card-
issuing banks would still have a slight issue generating revenue, be-
cause the interchange fees on low-priced items would not cover the 
cost per transaction and would lose some of the fees that were above 
the cost per transaction.167 One solution to this problem is to set the 
cap on the total above-the-average cost to account for the lower-
priced items.  
 Some might argue this imputes a windfall of fees on lower-priced 
items, but allowing this windfall might be better than creating a  
burden on these lower-priced transactions. The cost of these lower-
priced items has a greater effect on consumers with moderate-to-low 
incomes.168 The goal of this solution is to reallocate the burden more 
proportionally. This would eliminate the current problem of  
merchants that sell low-priced items, such as Redbox, coffee shops, 
and convenience stores, placing a disproportionate burden on their 
profit margins.  
 Another problem with this solution is that it does not solve the 
small-bank-exemption problem. Any restriction placed on the inter-
change fees that lowers them will place additional pressure on the 
smaller banks. This pressure might force some of these banks out of 
the market, or it might force them to use other methods to generate 
revenue. Some small banks might still want to offer debit card ser-
vices, even if they are generating little or no revenue on that service, 
because they would not want to lose customers. Even assuming there 
are no regulations on debit card interchange fees, larger banks might 
                                                                                                                                 
 165. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of two-sided markets.  
 166. This is shown supra Figure 1 by the flatter slope of the percentage. The graph also 
shows that the interchange fee would always be smaller than it would have been before the 
Durbin Amendment.  
 167. Under the example given in the first paragraph supra Part V.E, a transaction of 
$1 would have an interchange fee of one cent, which is likely not enough to cover the 
transaction costs.  
 168. John, supra note 41, at 2.  
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pressure the smaller banks out of the market, because a larger 
bank’s ability to spread its fixed costs over more transactions will al-
ways result in lower costs per transaction. 
 This option could also continue the fraud-prevention incentive.169 
However, this Note suggests altering that incentive to increase the 
cap by a certain amount, accurately reflecting the added cost per 
transactions. This incentive likely would not affect lower-priced 
transactions. If the fraud-prevention measures are variable costs and 
not fixed costs, then the increase in the cap might need to be an 
amount greater than the cost per transaction in order to compensate 
for the number of transactions below the cap.  
 Under this double-cap scheme, it would not be necessary to allow 
merchants to set minimum-purchase prices for consumers to use credit 
cards or debit cards, because the fee would return to a percentage of 
the purchase price, just like it did before the Durbin Amendment.  
 Merchants and consumers stand to benefit from this because, un-
der that scheme, merchants would be more willing to accept any 
method of payment from consumers. For example, merchants that sell 
furniture, a high-priced item, would have a $0.50 interchange fee, 
which would not noticeably cut into their profit margins. Consumers 
also stand to benefit because they could use their cards for smaller 
purchases without having to meet some threshold. For example, mer-
chants that sell something for $1, a low-priced item, would only be 
charged $0.01, which is a small proportion of the price.170   
 A double cap on the interchange fees is the optimal alternative 
because it eliminates disproportionate interchange fees on low-priced 
items while lowering the excessive interchange fees on high-priced 
items. Placing a double-cap on the interchange fees would result in a 
reasonable and proportional fee.  
VI.   CONCLUSION  
 Senator Durbin and other members of Congress saw a problem 
with the debit card interchange fees, so they recommended an  
additional provision to the Dodd-Frank Act, seeking to “help small 
businesses, merchants, and consumers by providing relief from high 
interchange fees for debit card transactions.”171 The Durbin Amend-
                                                                                                                                 
 169. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank 
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010); supra Part II.B.3.   
 170. Contrast this with an interchange fee of $0.21, which is 21% of a merchant’s po-
tential revenue. A merchant’s revenue will decrease by 21% before even considering the 
merchant’s operating costs.  
 171. 156 CONG. REC. S3695 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard  
Durbin); see also 156 CONG. REC. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (statement of Sen.  
Richard Durbin). 
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ment attempts to protect consumers and merchants from hidden  
interchange fees.  
 This Note does not suggest changing the goals of the Durbin 
Amendment, but instead, it suggests altering the Board’s final regu-
lation. The optimal regulation would more closely match the Durbin 
Amendment’s goal of reasonableness and proportionality while con-
sidering the card issuer’s cost per transaction. This Note suggests 
placing a double cap on interchange fees, which would be reasonable 
because it regulates the entire chargeable amount and proportional 
because it is based on a stated percentage of the purchase price. 
